Justia Wyoming Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group of residents from the Rafter J Ranch Subdivision in Teton County, Wyoming, appealed the Teton County Board of County Commissioners' approval of a petition by Stage Stop, Inc. to amend the Rafter J Planned Unit Development (PUD) to allow the use of Lot 333 for workforce apartments. The residents, referred to as Objectors, argued that the Board's decision was subject to judicial review, that the Board erred by allowing the PUD Amendment without requiring a vacation of the Rafter J Subdivision Plat, and that the Board's approval of the PUD Amendment was arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with the law.The District Court of Teton County affirmed the Board's decision. The Objectors then appealed to the Supreme Court of Wyoming. The Objectors argued that the Board's decision was a legislative act and therefore not subject to judicial review. They also claimed that the Board did not follow the proper procedure for amending the PUD and that the Board did not properly consider the requirement that the PUD Amendment comply with the underlying base zoning to the maximum extent practicable.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Board's approval of the PUD Amendment was subject to judicial review to determine whether the Board followed its rules and regulations. The court also found that the Board properly considered Stage Stop's request to amend the PUD and that the Board's decision had no effect on any private contractual rights which the Objectors may have from the Plat restrictions. The court concluded that the Board followed the Land Development Regulations (LDRs) and made reasonable choices in approving the PUD Amendment. View "Brazinski v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

An automobile accident in Idaho resulted in Emily Fairbanks receiving severe injuries while a passenger in a vehicle driven by Holly Galbraith. Fairbanks filed two lawsuits: one against the Idaho Transportation Department claiming negligent maintenance of a guardrail, and another against Galbraith in Wyoming for negligence. Galbraith sought to dismiss the Wyoming suit, citing that the statute of limitations had elapsed. The district court denied the motion. Later, Galbraith was granted summary judgment based on collateral estoppel, preventing relitigation of negligence and damages issues established in the Idaho case.Both parties appealed. Galbraith claimed the lower court had erred in its conclusion about the statute of limitations, while Fairbanks disputed the application of collateral estoppel and the application of Idaho's statutory cap on non-economic damages. The Supreme Court of Wyoming concluded that the statute of limitations had run before Fairbanks filed her complaint, reversing the district court's ruling on the issue. The court did not address the merits of the collateral estoppel appeal. The court found that under Idaho law, Fairbanks' lawsuit was time-barred as she made no effort to locate Galbraith during the time Galbraith was out of state, thus the statute of limitations was not tolled. View "Galbraith v. Fairbanks" on Justia Law

In Wyoming, Jerry Peterson brought a case against the Laramie City Council, alleging that the council violated the Wyoming Public Meetings Act by holding its meetings remotely during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. Peterson argued that this remote format presented a barrier to attendance at the council meetings, violating a section of the Act that states a member of the public should not be required to fulfill any condition precedent to their attendance. The District Court dismissed the case on the grounds of laches, asserting that Peterson had delayed unreasonably in filing the suit. However, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed this decision and remanded the case back to the lower court. The Supreme Court found that the District Court had incorrectly determined Peterson's claims all accrued at the same time and that it had improperly taken judicial notice of the City Council's evidence. The Supreme Court also concluded that the District Court had made an erroneous conclusory determination that the City Council would be prejudiced by Peterson’s delay in bringing his action. View "Peterson v. Laramie City Council" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, State Representatives Rachel Rodriguez-Williams and Chip Neiman, and Right to Life of Wyoming, Inc., attempted to intervene in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of two Wyoming laws restricting abortion. The district court denied their motion to intervene, and they appealed that decision. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the proposed intervenors did not meet the requirements for intervention as of right. The court found that the proposed intervenors did not demonstrate a significant protectable interest in the lawsuit. The court also found that the State of Wyoming, represented by the Attorney General, adequately represented the proposed intervenors' interests in defending the challenged laws. Additionally, the court found that allowing the proposed intervenors to participate in the lawsuit would unduly delay and prejudice the case's adjudication. Therefore, the court also denied the proposed intervenors' motion for permissive intervention. View "Rodriguez-Williams v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision to grant Mrs. Tokowitz the right to a spousal election against her late husband's will. The late Mr. Tokowitz had left his estate to a revocable trust and made no provision for Mrs. Tokowitz in his will. The court held that Mrs. Tokowitz was not deprived of her spousal election right simply because her husband's property was transferred to his trust through a pour-over will. The court reasoned that property transferred by a pour-over will is part of the decedent's probate estate until the will is probated. Only after probate does it pass in accordance with section 2-6-103 to the trust to be distributed by the trust terms. The court also found that Mr. Tokowitz was domiciled in Wyoming at the time of his death, as evidenced by his will, making Mrs. Tokowitz eligible for the spousal election under Wyoming law. The court declined to rule on Mrs. Tokowitz's rights as a beneficiary under the trust, stating that issues relating to the trust were outside of its jurisdiction. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Tokowitz v. Tokowi" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, Kristina Croy, a daycare operator, was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter following a six-day jury trial. The charges stemmed from an incident in which an eight-month-old infant, MG, in her care died due to positional asphyxia resulting from being improperly swaddled. Croy appealed, arguing, among other things, that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The Court affirmed the conviction, stating there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that swaddling MG posed a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, and that Croy had consciously disregarded that risk. The Court also ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed a juror who had discussed the case with another juror prior to deliberations, violating the court's instructions not to prejudge the case. Furthermore, the Court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or deprive Croy of a fair trial when it declined her request to impose restrictions on how the State split its time between closing summation and rebuttal argument. The Court's decision was based on the particular facts of the case, noting that Croy could not demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability the verdict might have been more favorable to her if the prosecutor had not been allowed to make a lengthy rebuttal argument. View "Croy v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

In a divorce case, the appellant, Mr. James Baker, contested the decree entered by a successor district judge after the original district judge who presided over the trial retired. Mr. Baker argued that the successor judge violated his right to due process by making findings of fact and conclusions of law without a formal certification under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (W.R.C.P.) 63.The Supreme Court of Wyoming concluded that Mr. Baker had waived his right to object to the successor judge's procedure. During a status conference, in which the successor judge proposed to proceed with determining the case based on the trial transcripts, Mr. Baker's counsel affirmed this approach and requested the court to make a ruling based on the existing record. Therefore, the court ruled that Mr. Baker intentionally relinquished his right to object to the successor judge's procedure, constituting a waiver.The court also clarified that the language in W.R.C.P. 63 does not necessitate the successor judge to advise the parties of their rights under the rule. The court found no authority supporting an affirmative duty for the successor judge to do so. Hence, the court affirmed the decree of divorce entered by the successor district court judge. View "Baker v. Baker" on Justia Law

In the child protection case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the appellant, Dominique Desiree Sciacca (Mother), contested the termination of her parental rights to her minor child, JDD. The Department of Family Services had filed a petition for termination based on Mother's neglect of the child and her failure to comply with a reunification plan. The District Court of Goshen County granted the Department's petition. On appeal, Mother did not dispute the grounds for termination but argued that her due process rights were violated because she was not physically present in court for the termination hearing, although she was allowed to participate by phone. She also contended that the court violated procedural rules by allowing her to testify by phone from the same location as the child's father, without adequate safeguards to protect her from his influence. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no violation of due process or procedural rules. The court ruled that Mother was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard and that the lower court had implemented sufficient safeguards during her phone testimony. View "In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: JJD v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part Petitioners' petition for a writ of review seeking interlocutory review of the orders of the district court denying Petitioners' motion to dismiss and motion to set aside default, holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the default judgment.At issue was subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction based on service by publication. Petitioners argued that the failure to serve Defendants with a summons stripped the district court of both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. The First Circuit held (1) absent a statute or rule to the contrary, no summons is required when service is accomplished by publication; (2) the district court correctly determined that a summons is not required as to those defendants who are properly subject to service by publication; but (3) the court erred in finding the service by publication conferred personal jurisdiction over the defendants with a known address. View "Hopeful v. Etchepare, LLC" on Justia Law

In this complaint brought by Black Diamond Energy and Black Diamond Energy of Delaware (together, the BDE Companies) and seventeen limited partnerships (the Limited Partnerships) the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing with prejudice the complaint, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice.The complaint alleged that S&T Bank's lending policies in the wake of the 2008 economic recession caused severe financial loss to the seventeen limited partnerships (the Limited Partnerships) managed by Black Diamond Energy and Black Diamond Energy of Delaware (together, the BDE Companies). Daniel Groskop, the trustee of a trust formed by the Limited Partnership, was later substituted for the Limited Partnerships as the true party in interest on the condition that the BDE Companies' claims against the Bank be dismissed with prejudice. Due to Groskop's noncompliance with discovery orders and the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Groskop's violation of two court orders compelling discovery, two orders awarding attorneys' fees, and the failure to fulfill the representative duties associated with Wyo. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) required dismissal with prejudice. View "S&T Bank v. Groskop" on Justia Law