Justia Wyoming Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of first-degree sexual assault and robbery. After losing his appeal, Appellant filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective. The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss, concluding that Appellant's claim was procedurally barred pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 7-14-103(a)(iii) because he raised a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his direct appeal, which was decided on the merits. The Supreme Court likewise dismissed the petition, holding (1) where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been raised and decided against the appellant in his direct appeal, he may not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, based upon different allegations, in a petition for post-conviction relief, as the claim is procedurally barred by section 7-14-103(a)(iii); and (2) a stand-alone claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not cognizable under the post-conviction relief statutes because post-conviction relief is limited to the alleged denial of constitutional rights during the proceedings that resulted in conviction. View "Schreibvogel v. State " on Justia Law

A police officer was presented with an emergency situation when, upon entering Appellant Joseph Owens' motel room, he found Appellant convulsing on the floor. The officer subsequently searched Appellant's backpack and the containers found therein in an attempt to aid Appellant and discovered methamphetamine. Appellant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of methamphetamine. Owens reserved the right to appeal the constitutionality of the search that resulted in discovery of the methamphetamine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the circumstances presented, the State satisfied its burden of establishing specific and articulable facts showing that the search was justified pursuant to the officer's community caretaker function. View "Owens v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Derrick Brock, the assistant manager at a restaurant, failed to deposit the restaurant's previous two day earnings at the bank, and afterwards, never returned to work. Following a jury trial, Appellant Derrick Brock was convicted of larceny by bailee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call investigating officers to testify regarding their investigation; (2) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate or interview or call key witnesses with possibly exculpatory information; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the prosecution's objection to cross-examination of a witness regarding statements made to the police. View "Brock v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant, Andy Lovato, entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of methamphetamine. Appellant appealed, claiming the district court incorrectly concluded that his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated when he was seized by the police. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it denied Appellant's motion to suppress evidence because the police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying briefly detaining Appellant for further investigation; and (2) the police had probable cause to arrest Appellant for interference when a peace officer after he failed to obey one officer's commands to stop and then struggled with the police officers. View "Lovato v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Timothy Shaeffer was convicted of aggravated assault and battery after he waved around a flare gun during an altercation at a bar. On appeal, Appellant claimed he was subject to numerous errors, which affected his right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to appoint Appellant new counsel on the second day of trial; (2) the trial court did not violate Appellant's right to self-representation, as Appellant never made an unequivocal request to represent himself; (3) the trial court did not require Appellant to wear excessive physical restraints, and the trial court's failure to not instruct the jury regarding the shackles did not constitute plain error; (4) after Appellant had been deemed competent to proceed, the circumstances at trial were not such that would have required an additional competency evaluation; (5) the trial court did not exhibit judicial bias against Appellant; and (6) the State did not provide the trial court with inappropriate or incorrect information at the sentencing hearing. View "Schaeffer v. State" on Justia Law

Steven Kruger pled guilty to felony child abuse. At the scheduled sentencing Kruger sought to withdraw the guilty plea. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Kruger's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding (1) considering the totality of the circumstances, Kruger's plea was knowing and voluntary; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Kruger did not present any "fair and just reason" to withdraw his guilty plea; and (3) Kruger's plea was not in the nature of an Alvord plea because Kruger never professed his innocence and did not meet his burden of proving that the victims recanted. View "Kruger v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to one count of interference with a police officer. The district court sentenced Appellant to three to six years incarceration. The prison sentence was suspended pursuant to the split sentencing provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 7-13-107, and Appellant was ordered to serve 180 days in jail, to be followed by four years of supervised probation. Later, Appellant admitted to violating his probation, after which the district court reimposed the original sentence, giving credit for time served. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in reimposing sentence after Appellant's probation was revoked. View "Castillo v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant David Walker was convicted of felony stalking as a result of an encounter with his ex-wife in violation of a permanent order of protection. A conviction for stalking required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that plain error resulted when the trial court instructed the jury that evidence of acts comprising a course of conduct of harassment admitted as Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b) uncharged misconduct need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence where a course of conduct of harassment is an element of the charged offense. View "Walker v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Enroe Jealous was convicted of aggravated assault and battery and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three to eight years. Jealous appealed, contending that the district court committed reversible error when it failed to properly instruct the jury on the elements of the crime. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury was not misled or confused as to the elements of the crime; (2) the district court did not plainly err by failing to define the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," and "recklessly"; and (3) it was not plain error for he district court to instruct the jury that it could base its verdict on any and all proven theories of guilt. View "Jealous v. State" on Justia Law

A jury found Gloria Landeroz (1) guilty of aggravated assault and battery and (2) not guilty of attempted first degree murder and the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter. The State subsequently moved for dismissal of the attempted first degree murder charge without prejudice. The district court granted the motion. Landeroz appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the district court erred in dismissing the charge because in doing so it exposed her to double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the jury verdict but remanded for an entry of an order clarifying that the dismissal of the attempted first degree murder charge was "with prejudice" as to that offense, but "without prejudice" as to the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter, holding (1) to the extent the dismissal without prejudice suggested Landeroz could be re-prosecuted for attempted first or second degree murder, the order violated the double jeopardy clause; and (2) Landeroz did not meet her burden of providing a Brady violation occurred, depriving her of due process. View "Landeroz v. State" on Justia Law