Justia Wyoming Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Richard Vasco was arrested for interference with a police officer and for driving under the influence of alcohol. Vasco refused to submit to chemical testing, and the Wyoming DOT advised him that it was suspending his driver's license for six months. Vasco requested a hearing, at the conclusion of which the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension. Vasco sought review in the district court, which affirmed the OAH order. Vasco appealed, claiming the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for interference, and therefore the subsequent search was improper and the evidence obtained in the search that supported the DUI arrest was inadmissible. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that substantial evidence supported the OAH decision where (1) the officer had probable cause to arrest Vasco for interference with a police officer, and (2) the officer had probable cause to believe Vasco had been driving under the influence of alcohol. View "Vasco v. Wyo. DOT" on Justia Law

Defendant William Bruyette was charged with felony possession of marijuana. At trial, he sought to introduce evidence that he obtained the marijuana in California with a prescription for medical marijuana. The district court granted the State's in limine motion to exclude evidence relating to a medical marijuana defense and instructed the jury that possession of medical marijuana was not a defense to the crime charged. The jury convicted defendant of felony possession of marijuana. Defendant appealed, claiming the district court denied him his constitutional right to present his defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the question of whether or not defendant had a medical marijuana card from a California physician was irrelevant because it is illegal, under Wyoming law, for a physician to prescribe or order the possession of marijuana. View "Bruyette v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Gary Marquess was tried and convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and battery, battery, kidnapping, and being a habitual criminal. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) the district court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of the events that occurred the first day of the alleged assault, and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence a 911 recording as a prior consistent statement under Wyo. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). The Supreme Court held (1) the admission of evidence of events occurring on March 1, 2009 did not result in a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law and therefore plain error did not occur; and (2) the 911 call statements were improperly admitted as prior consistent statements under 801(d)(1)(B) because they were not offered to rebut a recent charge of fabrication, improper motive or influence. However, the the 911 call statements were properly admissible as an excited utterance under Wyo. R. Evid. 803(2). Affirmed. View "Marquess v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his murder conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial without a hearing. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant the appellant's motion for a new trial and whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by violating discovery orders, by violating a pre-trial order regarding uncharged misconduct evidence, and by eliciting testimony from a law enforcement officer that the officer believed a witness was lying during an interview. The court held that, in the context of the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt, and the district court's detailed curative instruction, the court could not say that the post-trial motion should have been granted because plaintiff had not met his burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the denial of the new trial motion in respect to the stricken testimony. The court also held that appellant failed to show that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment and sentence. View "Willoughby v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of two counts of unlawfully touching a household member for a third or subsequent time in the past ten years, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii). The second incident of abuse to which that count related occurred 15 days after the amendment to the battery statute became effective and the revised subsection (b) no longer included the unlawful touching language as a means of committing battery. At issue was whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing amendment of the Information after the jury had entered into deliberations, withdrawing a jury instruction from the jury and replacing it with a new instruction, despite appellant's objection. Also at issue was whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence and committed reversible error. The court concluded that, because of the 15 day lapse from the time the statute was amended to the second of appellant's domestic violence offenses, the State's citations to subsection (b) instead of subsection (g) was a mere oversight. Therefore, the court held that appellant was not prejudiced by the Amended Information because he was not charged with a new crime when the State merely corrected a clerical error. The court also held that the sentence imposed by the trial court was an improper interpretation of the statute where unlawful touching, as it was used in section 6-2-501(g) could only be a misdemeanor subject to penalties in section 6-2-501(h) and therefore, appellant's 2 to 5 year prison sentence was illegal. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for resentencing.

Appellant was convicted of first-degree sexual assault and first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. Appellant, acting pro se, filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 contending that he was denied his constitutional right of access to the courts because he did not have adequate access to Wyoming legal research materials in a Nevada state correctional facility. Appellant challenged the district court's dismissal of his suit based on a failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the facts set forth in the complaint did not allege an actual injury and without any facts to indicate that appellant could have filed a viable petition for post-conviction relief, it could not determine that he had been injured by the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The court also held that, because appellant was able to file at least five petitions seeking relief from his conviction while he was an inmate at the Nevada state prison, and he was represented by court-appointed counsel in at least one of those actions, appellant's ability to conduct this volume of legal activity further indicated that he retained meaning access to the courts.

Appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, as well as a denial of his new trial motion, after he was found guilty of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault and battery, felony possession of a controlled substance, and interference with an emergency call. Appellant raised five issues of error on appeal. The court held that the district court did not err when it denied appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal where he waived his right to challenge the district court's ruling in his appeal and that the district court did not abuse its discretion and properly admitted the statements at issue as excited utterances under W.R.E. 803(2). The court also held that there was no plain error when the district court referred to the complaining witness as "the victim" where evidence of appellant's guilt was substantial and where there was no reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict would have been more favorable to appellant in the absence of that isolated statement. The court further held that appellant was not denied his constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury where the district court concluded that he did not satisfy the first part of the McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood test. The court finally held that appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel where appellant failed to establish that counsel's performance was legally deficient in any of the identified areas and where appellant made no showing of actual prejudice. Accordingly, the court found no reversible error and affirmed the district court's denial of a new trial and affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence.

Defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress after he was charged with two counts of sexual exploitation of children. At issue was whether the misstatement of fact in the affidavit for a search warrant be stricken as knowingly and intentionally made or in reckless disregard for the truth. Also at issue was whether defendant's right to confrontation and due process was violated based on a failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and, if stricken, whether probable cause for the search of the computer IP address or residence existed within the four corners of the affidavit. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress and held that defendant did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the deputy's misstatements were deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for the truth and that the affidavits, even without the proper date and time, provided probable cause to issue the search warrants. Furthermore, because defendant's conditional plea did not preserve any Brady v. Maryland issue, the court declined to consider the issue on appeal.

Appellant appealed his sentence contending that it was "illegal" when he was convicted of aggravated assault and battery where the sentence was conditionally stayed pending his admission to an alcohol treatment center ("WYSTAR"). At issue was whether appellant's sentence was illegal merely because the district court stayed its issuance of the mittimus, in order to conditionally release him for alcohol abuse treatment, and later issued the mittimus without a further hearing. The court held that the sentence imposed by the district court was unusual, and perhaps ill-advised. However, the court also held that it did not find in the record on appeal circumstances that rendered it an "illegal" sentence. Accordingly, the order of the district court denying appellant's motion was remanded for the purpose of amending the disputed sentence so as to credit him for all time served in connection with his detention at WYSTAR.

Appellant Leroy Harris challenged that portion of the district courtâs sentence which required him to pay, as a portion of the costs of prosecution, the fees paid by the State to some of the witnesses who testified against him. Appellant was charged with aggravated assault and battery, but acquitted by the jury on that count. Appellant also faced a misdemeanor charge to which he was convicted and required to pay a portion of the costs of prosecution. Appellant contended that he should not have had to pay witness fees for witnesses whose testimony was primarily related to the felony count for which he was acquitted. Appellant argued that the State failed to present any evidence to support its claim for the witness fees. The Supreme Court reviewed the lower court and agreed that the State did not present evidence sufficient to support its claim for costs. The Court affirmed the judgment, but reversed and remanded the sentence to remove the provision that Appellant pay the challenged witness fees.