Justia Wyoming Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Father and Mother separated, the parties’ child lived with Mother. Father later filed a petition to establish paternity and visitation, and, eventually, regular visitation between Father and the child was established. Father subsequently amended his petition to seek custody of the child. After a trial, the district court granted custody of the child to Father, subject to Mother’s visitation rights. Mother appealed, asserting that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to allow the child’s therapist to give opinion testimony at the custody hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the therapist’s opinion testimony because Mother did not comply with her discovery obligations. View "JN v. RFSG" on Justia Law

Due to the county attorney's allegations that Mother neglected Child, the juvenile court temporarily placed Child with Grandmother. Father agreed that Child should remain in the custody of the Department of Family Services (DFS) for placement with Grandmother under a consent decree, which provided that if Mother complied with certain requirements, the neglect action would be dismissed. While the consent decree was pending, Father asserted that he should have custody of Child. The juvenile court entered a permanency order continuing Child in DFS custody. Father appealed. The county attorney subsequently moved to dismiss the case and terminate DFS custody of Child on the grounds that Mother had completed her case plan and complied with the consent decree. The juvenile court dismissed the case. Father also appealed this order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the juvenile court did not err when it dismissed the case without a hearing and without making findings; and (2) the other issues raised by Father are moot, and no exception to the mootness doctrine applies. View "DB v. State" on Justia Law

Father and Mother had one child together when Mother filed for divorce. The district court ordered the parties to share physical custody of the child, alternating between Father’s residence and Mother’s residence until the child reached school age, at which time primary physical custody was awarded to Mother. With regard to the division of the marital estate, the court awarded Father most of the parties’ property and required Father to compensate Mother in the form of an equalizing payment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion when it ordered shared custody, as the court failed to consider the effect that the shared custody arrangement would have on the child; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in its division of the marital assets and liabilities. Remanded with instructions to award primary physical custody of the child to Mother, with reasonable visitation to Father. View "Williams v. Williams" on Justia Law

Mother and Father separated in 2005, when their child was ten months old, and largely shared parenting of the child. In 2012, Father filed a petition to establish custody, visitation, and child support. The district court first issued a temporary custody order addressing temporary custody, visitation, and child support during the pendency of the custody action. After a trial, the district court issued a final custody order awarding primary custody to Father and granting Mother liberal visitation rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in treating its final custody order as an initial custody determination rather than as a modification of an existing custody order; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration and weighting of the status quo and the child’s custody preference in making its custody determination. View "Demers v. Nicks" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife divorced in 2014. Wife appealed from the judgment of divorce, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in not awarding her alimony, erred in its property division, and erred in finding that Wife was able to work. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding alimony despite Wife’s five-year time limit in her request; (2) the district court equitably divided the marital property; and (3) the district court did not err in finding that Wife could conceivably work. View "Kamm v. Kamm" on Justia Law

In 2012, Robert Bratton filed a petition to be appointed the guardian of William Bratton, Robert’s brother. Jeanne Blenkinsop, William’s sister, responded with a counter petition seeking to be appointed guardian and conservator. The district court subsequently granted permanent guardianship and conservatorship to Blenkinsop and dismissed Robert’s petition. Thereafter, Blenkinsop filed a Guardian’s Second Report with the district court. The district court ratified and approved the report, thus rejecting Robert’s objections to the report. Blenkinsop later filed a “Conservator’s First Annual Accounting.” The district court confirmed and approved the accounting. Robert appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decisions accepting the Guardian’s Second Report and the Conservator’s First Annual Accounting, holding (1) the district court did not err in its judgments; and (2) because there was no reasonable cause for these appeals, Blenkinsop was entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. View "Bratton v. Blenkinsop" on Justia Law

Mother and Father, who never married, were the parents of two minor children. After the parties separated, the parties filed a stipulated order establishing custody and visitation, which was entered by the district court. The district court later entered a stipulated order for modification of child support, which required Father to pay child support in an amount based on the parties’ agreement that they were exercising shared custody. Father subsequently filed a petition to modify support, claiming a material change in circumstances. Mother requested that the district court order Father to pay child support in accordance with the presumptive child support guidelines that apply when one parent, i.e., Mother, has primary physical custody. The district court found that the existing custody arrangement was, in fact, not shared as the previous stipulated orders indicated and that Mother actually had primary custody based on the number of nights that the parties had the children overnight per year. The court then found a downward deviation was warranted under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 20-2-307(b) and reduced Father’s child support obligation from the presumptive amount. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deviating downward from the primary custody presumptive support amount. View "Dellit v. Tracy" on Justia Law

In 2014, Appellant filed a Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) motion seeking to set aside a 1999 default judgment granting Appellee a divorce. In support of her motion, Appellant alleged that the default judgment was void because the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the default judgment against her. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the motion was not filed within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in rejecting Appellant’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion based solely on Appellant’s delay in filing the motion, as Rule 60(b)’s time limitations do not generally apply to Rule 60(b)(4) motions to set aside a judgment as void; but (2) none of the defects Appellant alleged in the district court’s default judgment rendered the judgment void for lack of jurisdiction. View "Linch v. Linch" on Justia Law

Father and Mother had a sexual encounter in Portland, Oregon. Mother became pregnant as a result of the encounter. Mother returned to her hometown of Jackson, Wyoming, where the parties’ child was born. Father remained in Washington. Father filed a petition to establish paternity, custody and support and later filed additional pleadings concerning custody and visitation. The district court granted the parties joint legal custody, awarded primary physical custody to Mother, and awarded Father visitation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s award of primary physical custody to Mother, holding that the custody determination was not an abuse of the court’s discretion; but (2) remanded for further proceedings so that the district court could develop a visitation plan that provides additional detail with regard to visitation and covers a longer portion of the child’s life. View "IC v. DW" on Justia Law

Mother and Father were divorced in 2009 pursuant to a divorce decree that required Father to pay seventy-five percent of the parties’ children’s medical expenses not covered by insurance. At issue in this dispute was whether the costs of one of the parties’ daughter’s placement at a residential program should be treated as a counseling cost, which pursuant to the divorce agreement would be subject to a fifty-fifty split between the parties, or as a medical expense. The district court ruled that residential treatment is a medical expense and ordered Father to reimburse Mother the amount she paid to the residential program in excess of the seventy-five/twenty-five split dictated by the parties’ divorce agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) failing to recognize either a written or an implied agreement between Father and Mother to split the residential treatment costs equally; and (2) failing to apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel to find a binding agreement between the parties to share equally in the costs of their daughter’s residential treatment. View "Samiec v. Hopkins" on Justia Law