Justia Wyoming Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Appellant filed a Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) motion seeking to set aside a 1999 default judgment granting Appellee a divorce. In support of her motion, Appellant alleged that the default judgment was void because the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the default judgment against her. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the motion was not filed within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in rejecting Appellant’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion based solely on Appellant’s delay in filing the motion, as Rule 60(b)’s time limitations do not generally apply to Rule 60(b)(4) motions to set aside a judgment as void; but (2) none of the defects Appellant alleged in the district court’s default judgment rendered the judgment void for lack of jurisdiction. View "Linch v. Linch" on Justia Law

Father and Mother had a sexual encounter in Portland, Oregon. Mother became pregnant as a result of the encounter. Mother returned to her hometown of Jackson, Wyoming, where the parties’ child was born. Father remained in Washington. Father filed a petition to establish paternity, custody and support and later filed additional pleadings concerning custody and visitation. The district court granted the parties joint legal custody, awarded primary physical custody to Mother, and awarded Father visitation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s award of primary physical custody to Mother, holding that the custody determination was not an abuse of the court’s discretion; but (2) remanded for further proceedings so that the district court could develop a visitation plan that provides additional detail with regard to visitation and covers a longer portion of the child’s life. View "IC v. DW" on Justia Law

Mother and Father were divorced in 2009 pursuant to a divorce decree that required Father to pay seventy-five percent of the parties’ children’s medical expenses not covered by insurance. At issue in this dispute was whether the costs of one of the parties’ daughter’s placement at a residential program should be treated as a counseling cost, which pursuant to the divorce agreement would be subject to a fifty-fifty split between the parties, or as a medical expense. The district court ruled that residential treatment is a medical expense and ordered Father to reimburse Mother the amount she paid to the residential program in excess of the seventy-five/twenty-five split dictated by the parties’ divorce agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) failing to recognize either a written or an implied agreement between Father and Mother to split the residential treatment costs equally; and (2) failing to apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel to find a binding agreement between the parties to share equally in the costs of their daughter’s residential treatment. View "Samiec v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

The district court entered an order terminating the parental rights of Appellant, concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence to support three statutory grounds for termination of Appellant’s parental rights. Appellant appealed. Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel subsequently filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The Supreme Court then entered an order granting Appellant a motion for extension of time to file a pro se brief. Appellant did not file a pro se brief or other pleading in the time allotted. The Court subsequently granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and the district court’s order terminating the parental rights of Appellant. View "ANOL v. State, Dep’t of Family Servs." on Justia Law

Mother and Father had one child, TM, during their marriage. When the parties divorced, the custody order awarded Mother primary physical custody of TM. When Father learned that Mother was planning to marry and move with TM to live with her new husband in Texas, Father filed an amended petition to modify requesting primary physical custody of TM. After a trial, the district court found that Mother’s relocation constituted a material change in circumstances and that it was in TM’s best interest for Father to be awarded primary physical custody. Mother appealed, asserting that the district court abused its discretion when it found that Mother’s relocation constituted a material change of circumstances warranting the reopening of the original custody order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court could reasonably conclude that the considerable increase in the geographical distance between the parties created a material change in circumstances affecting the welfare of TM. View "Cook v. Moore" on Justia Law

After twenty years of marriage, Wife filed for divorce from Husband. The primary issue at trial concerned the division of the marital property. After the district court entered a divorce decree, Wife appealed, arguing that the court erred when it declined to require Husband to pay interest on the amount it ordered him to pay to equalize the division of marital property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly exercised its discretion when it suspended payment of interest as long as Husband makes annual payments of at least $15,000 toward the property allocation. View "Sinclair v. Sinclair" on Justia Law

Wife filed for divorce from Husband. The parties reached a settlement agreement as to child custody and visitation but were unable to agree concerning child support and the division of property. After a trial, the district court entered a decree dividing the marital property. Husband appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in valuing his interest in the family business and requiring him to make a lump sum payment to Wife. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Husband to pay the amount owed to Wife in a lump sum and in accepting the capitalization of earnings method for valuing the business. View "Stephen v. Stephen" on Justia Law

When Theresia Breen and Jamie Black divorced, Black was required to provide medical insurance for the parties’ four girls. The decree required the parties to split any medical costs remaining after deductibles were paid by Black and the insurer satisfied its obligations under the policy equally. In 2012, Breen filed a motion seeking Black’s share of medical expenses she had paid incurred for the children. Black paid the requested amount. In 2014, Black filed a motion seeking have Breen held in contempt for failing to pay her required half of the children’s medical expenses that were not paid under his health insurance policy. The district court held Breen in contempt and entered judgment against Breen for the $6,075 it determined she owed Black. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the civil contempt order except for that portion issuing a judgment to Black for $6,075; and (2) reversed the award of $6,075 because it included amounts Black was barred from seeking due to his failure to prove them after raising them in the 2012 proceedings. Remanded with instructions for the district court to recalculate the amount owed by Breen and to amend its order. View "Breen v. Black" on Justia Law

BHB was born in 2010 to Mother and Father, who were not married. Father filed a petition seeking to establish paternity, custody, visitation, and child support for BHB. After a trial held in 2014, the district court awarded primary custody of four-year-old BHB to Father. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary custody of BHB to Father after considering all of the evidence and concluding that it was in the best interests of BHB that Father be the primary custodial parent. View "JCLK v. ZHB" on Justia Law

The child in this case was twelve years old and in sixth grade when an educational neglect case was filed alleging that Father and Mother had “failed or refused to provide adequate education necessary for the child’s well being.” A consent decree was entered pursuant to which the child was to remain in his parents’ custody and the child and parents were to fulfill numerous behavioral and counseling conditions. One of those conditions was that Father and Mother obtain an alcohol/substance abuse evaluation and follow the regimen of treatment recommended. The State later moved to revoke the consent decree due to Mother’s consumption of alcohol. The juvenile court revoked the consent decree and reinstated the neglect proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case, holding that the juvenile court (1) did not lose jurisdiction over the neglect case after finding that the child’s education problems had been resolved; but (2) erred in concluding that Mother violated the terms of the consent decree by drinking alcohol. View "In re CDR" on Justia Law