Justia Wyoming Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was the mother of LNP. After Grandparents took LNP into their care, they petitioned for temporary guardianship of LNP, which the district court granted. Grandparents subsequently moved to convert the temporary guardianship to a plenary guardianship. In response, Appellant filed a motion to terminate the temporary guardianship. Mother then filed a motion to vacate the temporary guardianship, alleging that LNP was an Indian child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and that the court had failed to comply with the provisions of the ICWA in granting the temporary guardianship. After a hearing, the district court granted the guardianship petition and denied Appellant's request to terminate the guardianship. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in holding the hearing, district court (1) did not comply with the ICWA's ten-day notice requirement, but the error was harmless; (2) received testimony from a qualified expert witness as required by the ICWA; and (3) received clear and convincing evidence that showed LNP's return to Appellant would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage as required by the ICWA. View "In re Guardianship of LNP" on Justia Law

In 2008, the district court entered a default judgment and order establishing Father's paternity of a child and ordering him to pay child support. In 2011, the Department of Family Services (DFS) filed a petition for an order to show cause as to why Father should not be held in contempt of court for failing to pay child support. After Father requested counsel, the district court appointed counsel to represent Father. DFS objected to the court's order appointing counsel. The district court denied DFS's objection, ruling that due process required the state to provide an indigent party with counsel in a civil contempt proceeding for non-payment of child support when incarceration was one of the possible penalties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that appointment of counsel was not required because Wyoming has sufficient substitute procedural safeguards to protect indigent obligors against the possibility of wrongful incarceration. View "State, Dep't of Family Servs. v. Currier" on Justia Law

While Mother was living in Texas with her two girls, aged four and three, Mother contacted her mother (Grandmother), who lived in Wyoming, to report that her boyfriend (Boyfriend) had bitten her children. Grandmother brought the children to Wyoming. Grandmother contacted the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS), which led to the State filing juvenile petitions alleging that each girl was a neglected child. The district court adjudicated the children as neglected. Mother and Boyfriend appealed, contending that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) because this case was an interstate child custody dispute, the district court erred in exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Wyoming's Child Protection Act; (2) however, the district court had emergency jurisdiction under Wyoming's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA); and (3) therefore, the court's findings that the children were abused and Mother were not protected from the abuse were not in error, but the remainder of of the court's orders were vacated. Remanded for entry of orders that comply with the UCCJEA provisions governing a court's exercise of emergency jurisdiction. View "SC v. State, Dep't of Family Servs." on Justia Law

Mother and Father shared joint custody of their two children after their divorce. In 2011, Mother filed a notice of intent to relocate, indicating that she intended to move with the children to Virginia. Father subsequently filed a petition for modification of custody alleging that Mother's anticipated move constituted a material change in circumstances with respect to custody and visitation. Following the criteria set forth in Watt v. Watt, the district court concluded that Father had not established that Mother's relocation constituted a material change of circumstances sufficient to warrant consideration of a change in custody. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Watt's prohibition against considering relocation as a factor contributing to a material change in circumstances was overruled; and (2) remand was required to consider how the absence of the presumption in favor of the relocating, custodial parent created in Watt will affect the court's decision in this case. View "Arnott v. Arnott" on Justia Law

Appellant was the mother of five children. After Appellant was arrested, the children were taken into protective custody. The county attorney filed a neglect petition in juvenile court, and Appellant admitted to the allegations of neglect. Some months later, the Department of Family Services filed a petition to terminate Appellant's parental rights alleging (1) the children had been neglected, efforts to rehabilitate the family had been unsuccessful, and the children's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by returning to their mother; and (2) the children had been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, and Appellant was unfit to have custody and control of her children. The district court found that the evidence supported termination of Appellant's rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that sufficient evidence supported the district court's decision. View "HMH v. State, Dep't of Family Servs." on Justia Law

Mother and Father divorced. Mother was initially granted custody of their two children, but Father was later awarded sole custody of the children. Father subsequently relinquished physical custody of the younger child, AZS, to the children's maternal grandparents (Grandparents) after AZS was hospitalized for an appendectomy. The parties' older child, BJS, also moved to Wyoming to live with Grandparents. Thereafter, Mother petitioned for modification of custody, again seeking custody of the children. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, as Mother failed to satisfy her burden to provide a complete record for the Court's review, and Mother's brief failed to adhere to the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. View "Zeitner v. Shank" on Justia Law

While Mark and Elizabeth Dowell were still married, Mark created an irrevocable life insurance trust (ILIT) naming Elizabeth as is primary beneficiary and their two children as contingent beneficiaries. After the couple divorced, Mark filed a petition to modify the trust, contending that he did not need Elizabeth's consent to modify because she had relinquished her beneficial interest in the property settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mark. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the parties' divorce degree did not divest Elizabeth of her status as the primary beneficiary of the ILIT as a matter of law. Remanded with instructions to grant Elizabeth's motion for summary judgment. View "Dowell v. Dowell" on Justia Law

This opinion encompassed two separate cases that were consolidated for the purpose of decision. One of the appellants was the mother of KAT, SAT, and JGS. The other appellant was the father of JGS. Following a bench trial, the district court terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights to the minor children. Both parents appealed, claiming that the Department of Family Services (DFS) failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that their parental rights should be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DFS presented clear and convincing evidence to support the district court's decision to terminate Mother's rights to the three minor children and Father's rights to JGS. View "NLT v. State, Dep't of Family Servs." on Justia Law

Appellant and JLA were the biological parents of AMP. After JLA and JJA began living together, JJA filed a petition in district court seeking to adopt AMP. The petition alleged that Appellant's consent to the adoption was not required pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1-22-110(a)(iv) because he had willfully failed to contribute to the support of AMP for a period of one year immediately prior to the filing of the petition to adopt. Appellant responded to the petition but did not otherwise appear in the action. The district court granted the adoption of AMP to JJA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) despite Appellant's claim that his failure to pay AMP's support was not willful, the evidence supported the district court's conclusion that Appellant willfully ignored his obligation to support his child; and (2) because Appellant did not pay his accumulated arrearages, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the adoption. View "In re Adoption of AMP" on Justia Law

Appellant Donna Teeples was to receive a cash payment from her ex-husband, Neal Teeples, the appellee, as a result of the division of their marital assets pursuant to a divorce. Appellant claimed that the payment, made with the funds of an S corporation owned jointly prior to the divorce, impermissibly increased her tax liability and was made with funds that were rightfully owed to her as a prior shareholder in the company. The district court found that Appellee's payment out of the S account was not an income distribution from the corporation, nor did that payment cause Appellant to incur an additional tax liability. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the payment received by Appellant satisfied the terms of the property settlement agreement pursuant to the parties' divorce. View "Teeples v. Teeples" on Justia Law