Justia Wyoming Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Montana-Dakota Utilities Company (MDU) was ordered by the Wyoming Public Service Commission to make refunds of the amounts MDU had overcharged its customers because of improper calculations and adjustments to its commodity balancing account. MDU filed a petition for review, challenging the legal authority of the Commission to order refunds. The district court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the rule against retroactive ratemaking did not preclude the Commission from ordering the refund; (2) the Commission’s refund order did not violate the file rate doctrine; (3) the Commission was not subject to a statute of limitations in this case; (4) MDU failed to show that the Commission was equitably estopped from ordering a refund; and (5) the Commission’s action was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unlawful. View "Montana-Dakota Utils., Co. v. Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Wyoming Public Records Act, Plaintiff requested from the Office of the Governor and the Wyoming Game & Fish Department (together, the State) documents related to the status of grizzly bears under the Endangered Species Act. The State provided some documents and withheld others on grounds of the deliberative process privilege and the attorney-client communication privilege. The district court held (1) the Act incorporates the deliberative process privilege as a ground to exempt documents from disclosure under the Act, and the documents withheld under the deliberative process privilege were properly withheld by the State; and (2) two of the three documents withheld under the attorney-client privilege were properly withheld. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s ruling with respect to the documents withheld under the attorney-client privilege; (2) affirmed the district court’s ruling that the Act incorporates the deliberate process privilege; but (3) concluded that some of the documents withheld pursuant to the deliberative process privilege were not properly withheld because they were outside the scope of the privilege’s protection. View "Aland v. Mead" on Justia Law

Roger Seherr-Thoss (RST) owned and operated a gravel operation since at least 1977. In 1978, Teton County enacted its first Land and Development Regulations (LDRs). In 2011, Teton County issued RST an amended "notice to abate" requiring RST to reduce his production levels to pre-1978 levels because the business had expanded in volume and footprint since the LDRs were adopted. After a contested case hearing, the Teton County Board of County Commissioners entered an order recognizing that all aspects of RST’s gravel crushing and extraction operations were grandfathered but requiring RST to reduce its operation to its 1978 extent. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board’s order was an improper agency determination and exercise of authority. View "Seherr-Thoss v. Teton County Bd. of County Comm’rs" on Justia Law

Robert and Beverly Bernard sought a special exemption to operate a bed and breakfast in an area that was zoned as an R-1 Residence District. The Board of Adjustments approved the Bernards’ application, but the district court reversed because the agency failed to comply with its own rules and procedures. The Bernards subsequently filed a second application for a special exemption that differed from the first in that it included an approved parking plan and a certificate of occupancy. Timothy and Carole Tarver objected, claiming that the Bernards’ second application was barred by res judicata. The Board concluded that the second application was not barred by res judicata and granted the Bernards’ application with conditions. The Tarvers appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Bernards’ second application for a special exemption was not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel; (2) the Board had the authority to impose parking restrictions on the bed and breakfast as a condition of granting the special exemption; and (3) the Board properly applied its discretion in concluding that the Bernards were entitled to a special exemption. View "Tarver v. Bd. of Adjustments" on Justia Law

Erin Clements was injured at work and received temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for twelve months. Clements subsequently obtained an extension of TTD benefits for the statutory maximum of twelve months. When Clements applied for additional TTD benefits, the Worker’s Safety and Compensation Division denied her claim because she had received all the TTD benefits to which she was entitled under Wyoming law and Division rules. Clements filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the Division exceeded its authority when it limited the extension of TTD benefits to twelve months. The district court granted declaratory relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Division exceeded its authority when it adopted a rule setting a maximum number of months TTD benefits are payable under any circumstances. View "State ex rel. Dep’t of Workforce Servs. v. Clements" on Justia Law

In 1994, Appellant suffered modest physical injuries while working as a psychiatric aide at the Wyoming State Hospital. Four years later, Appellant was denied permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. Appellant continued seeking medical treatment. Appellant reapplied for PTD benefits in 2009, but the Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division denied her claim. After a case hearing, a panel of the Medical Commission denied the subsequent application for PTD benefits, concluding that Appellant’s only disabling condition was psychological and not related to any compensable physical injury. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission reasonably concluded that Appellant did not establish entitlement to PTD benefits under the Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Act or the odd lot doctrine, and the Commission’s conclusions were in accordance with applicable law. View "In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Hathaway" on Justia Law

After the Department of Family Services (DFS) received reports regarding the care Children were receiving from Mother and Stepfather, the State filed a neglect petition. DFS’s efforts to reunify Children with Mother failed. The juvenile court subsequently ordered Children to remain in the custody of Father and that DFS move to terminate the parental rights of Mother to Children. DFS appealed, claiming it could not move to terminate Mother’s parental rights because it did not have custody of Children and therefore was not an “authorized agency” that may file a petition to terminate one’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DFS was an “authorized agency” under the relevant statute regardless of whether it had physical and/or legal custody of Children. View "In re LB" on Justia Law

A school district (District) notified Plaintiff, a continuing contract teacher in the District, that his contract would be terminated on grounds of incompetence, insubordination, and poor work performance. Following a hearing, an independent hearing officer concluded that good cause existed for the termination of Plaintiff’s teaching contract and recommended that the contract be terminated for insubordination. The school district board of trustees (Board) accepted the hearing officer’s recommendation and conclusion. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Board’s order was entered in violation of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and his due process rights because some members of the Board did not attend the entire hearing or otherwise review all of the evidence submitted to the hearing officer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board did not err by accepting the hearing officer’s recommended decision without independently reviewing the entire evidentiary record received by the hearing officer. View "Wadsworth v. Bd. of Trs. of Lincoln County Sch. Dist. No. Two" on Justia Law

When the Union and the City entered into negotiations regarding the 2012-2013 wages and other employment terms for the City's fire department members, the City included in its negotiating team the mayor, one city council member, and other members of the City's administration and staff. The Union eventually filed a declaratory judgment seeking a ruling that a quorum of the city council was required to negotiate with the Union, the City could not unilaterally decide to conduct the negotiating sessions in public, and the proposals exchanged by the parties were not public records. The district court granted summary judgment declaring that a quorum of the city council was not obligated to participate in the negotiations and that the other two issues were not justiciable. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the statutes mandate a quorum of the city council to negotiate with the Union and that the other two issues were not justiciable. View "Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local Union No. 279 v. City of Cheyenne" on Justia Law

This case concerned Merit Energy Company's 2006 natural gas severance and ad valorem tax liability for wells located in several counties. Merit was a take-in-kind interest owner, which is a party who elects to take a portion of the mineral produced rather than receive monetary remuneration for its share of the production. The State Board of Equalization (SBOE) determined that Merit failed to timely appeal several final Wyoming Department of Revenue (DOR) decisions regarding the amount of taxable gas it had received and dismissed Merit's appeal. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in affirming the SBOE's dismissal as untimely; and (2) even if the Court permitted Merit to appeal the notice of valuation change sent by the DOR, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded Merit from doing so. View "Merit Energy Co. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law