Justia Wyoming Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Town of Jackson applied to the district court for an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) against Operation Save America (OSA), an anti-abortion protest group. The Town sought to restrict OSA's demonstration activities in and around the Jackson town square during the Boy Scouts' 2011 annual Elk Fest. The district court granted the TRO, which enjoined OSA from assembling on the town square without a permit or holding signs of any graphic nature on the square or within a two block radius thereof during the Elk Fest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the case was not moot and the TRO was a final appealable order; (2) the ex parte TRO was issued in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because under a strict scrutiny analysis, there was no evidence the TRO would serve a compelling government interest of protecting youth from disturbing images or maintaining the peace, and the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve the Town's interests; and (3) the district court violated Wyo. R. Civ. P. 65 by issuing the TRO without notice to OSA and an opportunity for OSA to be heard. View "Operation Save America v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

Appellant Miachel Maier was convicted of first-degree and attempted first-degree sexual assault. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) he was prejudiced by the admission of hearsay testimony and by prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, and (2) he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel at trial due to his attorney's failure to object to either the hearsay testimony or the prosecutor's closing remarks. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the district court admitted testimony that included inadmissible hearsay, Appellant was not denied a substantial right and was therefore not materially prejudiced; (2) the prosecutor's statements in his closing argument did not amount to misconduct; and (3) Appellant failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was so deficient as to require reversal of his conviction. View "Maier v. State" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between a surface owner and a timber estate owner. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court reversed a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the surface owner and remanded for proceedings to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the timber estate owner's predecessor in interest's (Union Pacific) reservations of timber in deeds from the early 1900s in order to determine the parties' intent with regard to the duration of the timber estates. The district granted judgment in favor of the surface owner, concluding (1) Union Pacific intended to reserve only those trees in existence at the time of the grant and of sufficient size to be suitable for use in construction, and (2) Union Pacific's timber reservations had expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly ruled, on the evidence before it, that Union Pacific intended its reservation of timber to include only trees of a suitable size which existed on the subject properties at the time of the deeds; and (2) the evidence presented at trial clearly established that such timber no longer existed on the properties. View "Ecosystem Res., L.C. v. Broadbent Land & Res., LLC " on Justia Law

Morrow Global (Morrow) filed suit against a Uinta County school district (District) and Windjammer Communications (Windjammer) that (1) sought a declaration that Morrow was a co-owner with the District of a conduit located under an interstate; (2) sought an order permanently enjoining the District from interfering with Morrow's use of the conduit; and (3) asserted that Windjammer had been unjustly enriched by using the conduit without paying for it. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District and Windjammer (Defendants) after treating Defendants' motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, concluding that Morrow had failed to present any facts showing that it was an owner of the conduit and entitled to the relief sought. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances, the district court improperly granted summary judgment when the parties had no opportunity to present evidence and argument on the issue of Morrow's ownership. View "World Family Corp v. Windjammer Commc'ns, LLC" on Justia Law

Kenneth Cook was terminated from his employment as a sheriff department deputy for violating department policies related to report writing and firearms security. Cook requested a contested case hearing before the sheriff, who upheld Cook's dismissal from the Department. The district court reversed, concluding that the record did not contain substantial evidence demonstrating cause existed to dismiss Cook on the basis of his violation of department policies. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the Sheriff's determination that cause existed to discharge Cook on the basis of his violation of department policies was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Laramie County Sheriff's Dep't v. Cook" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured when she was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The other vehicle involved in the accident, a truck, was listed on two different insurance policies: an Allstate policy issued to Jeremy Lucas and a Mountain West policy issued to Wyoming Electric Company. Appellee, Mountain West, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, requesting that the district court find Mountain West did not have to cover the truck under the policy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mountain West, finding that the owner of Wyoming Electric had given the truck to Lucas and, therefore, the truck was no longer covered under the company's insurance policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the truck was titled and registered in the name of Wyoming Electric and was still listed as a specific vehicle on the Mountain West Policy, Mountain West was not required to pay under the policy because, on the date of the accident, Wyoming electric no longer owned the truck and the truck was no longer covered under the Mountain West insurance policy. View "Mendenhall v. Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Rex and Vickie Lewis and Brad and Brenda Carnahan owned property in a subdivision. The Lewises filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Carnahans did not have authority to block their use of a public easement to access their property and an injunction requiring the Carnahans to remove a fence they erected across the easement. The Carnahans responded by seeking to have title to the easement quieted in them. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Lewises, holding (1) neither the statute of limitations nor laches barred the Lewises' declaratory judgment action; and (2) the easement remained dedicated to public use, meaning the Lewises had the right to use the easement and the Carnahans did not have the right to obstruct their use. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the Lewises had standing to bring their claim for declaratory relief; (2) the Lewises' claims were not barred by the statute of limitations or the equitable doctrine of Laches; and (3) an affidavit recorded in 1994 was not effective to vacate the public easement. View "Carnahan v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Appellant Chad Mebane was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and two counts of delivery of methamphetamine. Mebane appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to advise him before he testified that he had a right not to testify and, as a result, his choice to testify was not made intelligently. Mebane appealed, contending that the trial court erred in failing to advise him at the close of the State's case that he did not have to testify. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mebane was adequately advised by the trial court at arraignment of his right to remain silent; and (2) Mebane voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to remain silent. View "Mebane v. State" on Justia Law

This was the second of two related lawsuits filed by Torrington Livestock Cattle Company (TLCC) against Daren and Jennifer Berg. In the first suit, Daren was found liable for breach of contract, conversion, and fraud. The court entered judgment in the favor of TLCC in the amount of $517,635, but the judgment remained unsatisfied. While the first suit was pending, the Bergs signed a promissory note with the First Bank of Torrington. As collateral, the bank acquired security interests in a variety of the Bergs' property, including livestock and ranching equipment. Later, the bank assigned the promissory note to TLCC. After the Bergs did not make the first payment, TLCC commenced the instant action, alleging breach of contract for promissory note and to enforce security agreement. The district court determined that no material issues of fact existed and TLCC was entitled to summary judgment. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court based upon the deficient brief offered by the Bergs and their failure to follow the rules of appellate procedure. View "Berg v. Torrington Livestock Cattle Co." on Justia Law

Joseph Dax faced state and federal criminal charges arising from a burglary that involved theft of firearms. After the federal court imposed sentence, Dax was transferred to state custody. Thereafter the state imposed sentence. Dax requested credit for time served, which the district court denied. Dax later filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, requesting credit for time served and claiming that he should receive credit against his state sentence for time spent in pre-trial detention on his federal charge. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that res judicata barred review of the issue because Dax did not take advantage of the opportunity to raise it multiple times before. View "Dax v. State" on Justia Law