Justia Wyoming Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jeff Lokey and Mike Irwin were business partners in two Wyoming businesses. After the parties dissolved their shared business interests, Irwin filed suit against Lokey, alleging that Lokey had materially breached the terms of the agreement. When Lokey did not timely file an answer the district court entered a default judgment against Lokey that included a provision allowing the parties ten days to file objections to the judgment. Lokey filed an objection, which the district court denied. Lokey appealed, challenging the court’s denial of his objections. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because Lokey did not timely appeal an appealable order; but (2) the Court had jurisdiction to award, and Irwin was entitled to recover, reasonable attorney fees incurred as a result of this appeal. View "Lokey v. Irwin" on Justia Law

Imogene and Clyde Snell were the parents of William Snell and Clyde Allen Snell (Allen). William and Allen were remainder beneficiaries of a revocable trust executed by Imogene. The trust contained a choice of law provision directing that it be construed and governed by the laws of Arkansas. After Imogene’s death, William filed an action for a trust accounting from Clyde, the sole trustee and current beneficiary of the trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of William and ordered Clyde to produce certain trust documents. Clyde appealed. The Supreme Court exercised its discretion to convert Clyde’s notice of appeal to a petition for writ of review and granted the writ to resolve the legal issue of whether William was entitled to an accounting, holding (1) the district court’s summary judgment order was not a final appealable order; and (2) the district court correctly determined that, under Arkansas law, William was entitled to an accounting. Remanded to the district court for immediate release of the records. View "Snell v. Snell" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant was arrested for the 1972 rape and murder of Sharon Reher. After a jury trial, Defendant was acquitted of rape and murder but convicted of attempted rape. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to exclude results of touch DNA testing and that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the touch DNA evidence was not so unreliable that it ought to be excluded from the jury’s consideration; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction and the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal. View "Bean v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to three counts of second-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to three consecutive sentences of eight to sixteen years. The district court credited ninety-nine days of presentence confinement toward Defendant’s first sentence. Defendant later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that he should have been credited for time served against all three consecutive sentences. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while res judicata would normally apply to bar Defendant’s motion, this was an appropriate case to consider the application of presentence confinement credit to consecutive sentences; (2) when consecutive sentences are ordered, the presentence credit for time served should be applied in such a way that the defendant receives credit against the total time of incarceration; and (3) Defendant’s aggregate sentence in this case was legal. View "Palmer v. State" on Justia Law

Father and Mother were not married and shared custody of their two children. Father filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, visitation, and support after he learned that Mother planned to move from Wyoming to Montana with the children. After a temporary custody hearing, the court awarded the parties joint legal custody with temporary residential custody to Mother. Mother then moved with the children to Montana. After a bench trial, the court awarded Father primary residential custody, subject to Mother’s visitation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded primary residential custody to Father. View "JR v. TLW" on Justia Law

The State charged Appellant with aggravated assault and battery. At trial, Appellant claimed he had acted in self-defense. After a three-day trial, the jury found Appellant guilty. Appellant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Following a hearing on Appellant’s motion for a new trial, the district court denied the motion, concluding that Appellant had not demonstrated that the evidence was so material that it would probably produce a different verdict if a new trial was granted and that the evidence did not provide proper grounds for granting a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial. View "Emerson v. State" on Justia Law

After Mother’s youngest two children were placed in the legal custody of Wyoming’s Department of Family Services (Department), Mother was convicted of assault and battery and incarcerated. The Department subsequently filed a petition for termination of parental rights against Mother. Mother failed to timely answer, plead, or otherwise defend, and the clerk of court entered default against Mother. Mother filed a motion to set aside the default. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Mother failed to establish good cause to set aside the default. After a default hearing on termination of Mother’s parental rights, the district court found that clear and convincing evidence established that Mother’s parental rights to the children should be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court had appellate jurisdiction to consider the substantive issues raised by Mother; (2) the district court did not err as a matter of law in denying Mother’s motion to set aside the entry of default; and (3) the Department presented sufficient evidence to support termination of Mother’s parental rights to the two children. View "CLB v. State, Dep’t of Family Servs." on Justia Law

After Mother’s youngest two children were placed in the legal custody of Wyoming’s Department of Family Services (Department), Mother was convicted of assault and battery and incarcerated. The Department subsequently filed a petition for termination of parental rights against Mother. Mother failed to timely answer, plead, or otherwise defend, and the clerk of court entered default against Mother. Mother filed a motion to set aside the default. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Mother failed to establish good cause to set aside the default. After a default hearing on termination of Mother’s parental rights, the district court found that clear and convincing evidence established that Mother’s parental rights to the children should be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court had appellate jurisdiction to consider the substantive issues raised by Mother; (2) the district court did not err as a matter of law in denying Mother’s motion to set aside the entry of default; and (3) the Department presented sufficient evidence to support termination of Mother’s parental rights to the two children. View "CLB v. State, Dep’t of Family Servs." on Justia Law

Defendant entered a plea of no contest to one count of delivery of methamphetamine. In 2011, the district court revoked Defendant’s probation and entered judgment on her no contest plea. The court sentenced Defendant to a term of years in prison but suspended the sentence and placed her on supervised probation. Defendant’s probation was set to expire in February 2014, but in January 2014, a probation agent filed a petition to extend her probationary term to August 2015. Defendant filed a document agreeing to the extension but was not represented by counsel. The district court subsequently entered an order extending probation. In February 2015, the State petitioned to revoke Defendant’s probation. Defendant argued that the probation extension had not been handled properly and if the probation extension had not been entered, Defendant’s probation would have expired prior to the February 2015 revocation hearing. The district court ruled that Defendant did not have the right to counsel during her probation extension proceeding. The court then revoked Defendant’s probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s challenge to the probation extension entered more than one year before her probation was revoked was time barred. View "Poignee v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor breach of peace and misdemeanor interference with a peace officer. Two days later, the State filed an information charging Defendant with felony interference with a peace officer arising out of the same events as those underlying his misdemeanors convictions. Defendant entered an unconditional plea of no contest to a reduced charge of misdemeanor interference. Defendant appealed, arguing that his second misdemeanor conviction violated his double jeopardy protections. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not waive his double jeopardy claim; and (2) because Defendant committed two separate acts of interference, one inside his home and one outside his home, Defendant could lawfully be prosecuted for each separate offense. View "Redding v. State" on Justia Law