Justia Wyoming Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After an exhaust pipe in the furnace in their home ruptured, Richard and Mary Horning were diagnosed with having sustained severe carbon monoxide poisoning. The Hornings sued Penrose Plumbing & Heating, Inc. and others, alleging that Penrose was negligent in installing the heating, ventilation and air conditioning system. The district court granted summary judgment for Penrose, determining that the Hornings did not file their complaint within the applicable ten-year statute of repose. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in its interpretation of the applicable statute of repose; and (2) under the facts of this case, the Hornings’ complaint was timely filed. View "Horning v. Penrose Plumbing & Heating Inc." on Justia Law

A vehicle owned by Kindel Concrete LLC and driven by one of its employees, Tim Ouimette, rear-ended Kim Bolding’s vehicle. Bolding filed suit against Kindel and the Employee, alleging negligence and negligent entrustment. Bolding and Ouimette settled, and default was entered against Kindel. After a default judgment hearing, the court ruled against Bolding, concluding that she failed to prove causation and damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly concluded that Bolding failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the future medical expenses she claimed were reasonably probable to occur as the result of the accident; (2) did not abuse its discretion by when it refused to settle the record pursuant to Wyo. R. App. P. 3.03; and (3) did not abuse its discretion when it found that Bolding had not met her burden to prove her damages were caused by Kindel’s negligence. View "Bolding v. Kindel Concrete, LLC" on Justia Law

Father and Mother were divorced in the winter of 2013. Later that year, Mother filed a contempt action asserting that Father had violated the divorce decree in several respects. The district court entered orders (1) holding Father in contempt for failing to provide health insurance coverage and/or proof of insurance for the parties’ daughter; (2) sanctioning Father for failing to exercise summer visitation with the parties’ son; (3) ordering that Mother would have use of outbuildings associated with the residence in which she and the children were entitled to reside under the decree; and (4) requiring Father to pay Mother’s attorney fees associated with the contempt motion. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence that Father violated an order requiring visitation with his son; (2) because the evidence showed that Father had obtained the required insurance for his daughter, Father’s contempt was not proven by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) the district court properly required Father to pay attorney fees Mother incurred when she was required to seek court enforcement of the divorce decree. View "Bullock v. Bullock" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of stalking and kidnapping. The Supreme Court reversed the stalking conviction and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the stalking conviction; (2) the jury correctly found that Appellant was not entitled to a mitigated sentence for the kidnapping charge, as there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Appellant did not voluntarily release his kidnapping victim; and (3) the jury was properly instructed on the lesser included charge of felonious restraint, a lesser included offense to the crime of kidnapping. View "Hawes v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of four counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree and was sentenced to thirteen to fifteen years on each count, to be served consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se motion for sentence reduction pursuant to Wyo. R. Crim. P. 35(b) requesting that the district court merge his sentences on the grounds that all of the charges stemmed from the same offense and therefore violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s claim was barred by res judicata because he failed to present his double jeopardy claim in his initial appeal. View "Leonard v. State" on Justia Law

From Lilyanna Knudson’s birth until Ronald Scherer’s (Decedent) death, Knudson believed and considered the Decedent to be her father. After learning that he was not, Knudson filed a petition seeking a determination that she was the Decedent’s heir. Specifically, Knudson argued that, pursuant to the judicially-created doctrine of equitable adoption, she was the daughter and heir of the Decedent. The district court dismissed Knudson’s petition, concluding that Wyoming law does not recognize equitable adoption and that equitable adoption would be contrary to Wyoming’s probate code. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the Court’s interpretation of Wyoming’s probate code, Wyoming does not recognize the doctrine of equitable adoption, and therefore, Knudson was not an heir. View "In re Estate of Scherer" on Justia Law

Defendant was a juvenile when he was convicted in 1995 of felony murder and sentenced to life in prison, a sentence that was by operation of law the equivalent of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In 2013, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his sentence of life without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama. The district court certified two questions to the Supreme Court regarding the retroactivity of Miller. The Supreme Court held (1) the proper rule for determining whether a new constitutional rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review is the test announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane; (2) under a Teague analysis, the rule announced in Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review; and (3) by operation of the amended parole statutes, the current sentence Defendant was serving was life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years of incarceration. View "State v. Mares" on Justia Law

In 2009, Defendant pleaded guilty to drug possession. The district court later revoked Defendant’s probation but reinstated it on the condition that Defendant complete an in-patient treatment program. The court stated that Defendant would earn credit against his sentence for time spent in substance abuse treatment. In 2013, Defendant again violated the terms of his probation. At a hearing, the district court imposed the underlying sentence. Defendant sought credit for the time he spent in treatment, but the district court refused to award him such credit, concluding that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence prohibited the award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had discretion to award Defendant credit for time he spent in in-patient treatment and should have done so, in accordance with its earlier ruling, if Defendant successfully completed treatment. Remanded for a determination of whether Defendant successfully completed treatment. View "Daniels v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to five counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor. The district court sentenced Defendant to terms of imprisonment and ordered that Defendant be given credit for 721 days of pre sentence confinement. The court, however, did not specify how those days should be applied to Defendant's sentence. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed on all issues but remanded to the district court to specify how the credit for presentence confinement should be applied, holding (1) the prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement or engage in prosecutorial misconduct; and (2) the sentence’s reference to credit for presentence confinement was not sufficiently specific to comply with Wyo. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2)(F). View "Deeds v. State" on Justia Law

Wife and Husband were divorced by stipulated decree. In post-divorce contempt proceedings, each party claimed the other party was in contempt. The district court (1) concluded that both parties were in contempt for failing to list to martial residence for sale as required by the decree and ordered the home listed by a specified date; and (2) concluded Husband was not in contempt for failing to transfer half of his investment accounts and stock options to Wife but ordered Husband to transfer an investment account and three stock options to Wife. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly modified the stipulated decree when it ordered Wife to share any loss on the home if it sold, or, if it did not sell, to pay one-half of the mortgage payment; and (2) did not err in not ordering Husband to pay Wife’s fees and costs. View "McAdam v. McAdam" on Justia Law