Justia Wyoming Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to one count of solicitation to commit property destruction. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he was in West Virginia at the time of the alleged solicitation, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State had subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute Appellant for charges specified in the charging Information, as Defendant intended his criminal actions to have an effect in Wyoming; and (2) Appellant failed to carry his burden of showing that his representation by trial counsel was so ineffective that it rendered Appellant’s guilty plea involuntary. View "Turner v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional Alford plea to possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence, arguing that she should have been permitted to leave the scene of a traffic stop when she asked to leave, that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain her, and that she should have been read her Miranda rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) law enforcement had reasonable, articulable suspicion on which to detain Defendant; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, Defendant was not entitled to receive Miranda rights. View "Engdahl v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in Sweetwater County, Appellant was found guilty of third-degree sexual abuse of a minor for offenses committed against a fifteen-year-old girl on a Greyhound bus. Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State had not offered evidence to prove that the crime had occurred in Sweetwater County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) that prosecutor’s tactics did not amount to judge-shopping so as to deprive Appellant of his constitutional right to due process; (2) the jury was correctly instructed regarding venue; (3) the evidence established that venue in Sweetwater County was proper; and (4) the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law regarding venue in her closing argument did not constitute reversible error. View "Anderson v. State Employment Sec. Div." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of larceny by bailee. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the district court erred in excluding alternate suspect evidence and in giving an improper jury instruction, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal, holding that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient under Wyoming law to support the guilty verdict, given Defendant’s the lack of any evidence of motive, ill will, any attempt to avoid apprehension by law enforcement, or physical evidence linking Defendant with the stolen property. View "Mraz v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted on two separate charges of delivery of a controlled substance and one charge of possession of a controlled substance. After the Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, Appellant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting that his two convictions and sentences on two charges of delivery resulted in his being punished twice for the same offense in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant committed two separate and distinct crimes on two separate dates, each charge included an element that was unique, and thus, double jeopardy did not attach. View "Mebane v. State" on Justia Law

Robert and Beverly Bernard sought a special exemption to operate a bed and breakfast in an area that was zoned as an R-1 Residence District. The Board of Adjustments approved the Bernards’ application, but the district court reversed because the agency failed to comply with its own rules and procedures. The Bernards subsequently filed a second application for a special exemption that differed from the first in that it included an approved parking plan and a certificate of occupancy. Timothy and Carole Tarver objected, claiming that the Bernards’ second application was barred by res judicata. The Board concluded that the second application was not barred by res judicata and granted the Bernards’ application with conditions. The Tarvers appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Bernards’ second application for a special exemption was not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel; (2) the Board had the authority to impose parking restrictions on the bed and breakfast as a condition of granting the special exemption; and (3) the Board properly applied its discretion in concluding that the Bernards were entitled to a special exemption. View "Tarver v. Bd. of Adjustments" on Justia Law

After Peggy Gheen died, her sons discovered quitclaim deeds Mrs. Gheen had executed to them for her interests in a residential property and a farm. The Gheen sons subsequently recorded the deeds. The State ex rel. Dep’t of Health, Div. of Healthcare Financing/Equitycare (Department) filed a lien against both properties to recover the cost of Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of Mrs. Gheen before her death. The Gheen sons filed a petition to remove a false lien and quiet title, claiming they were the rightful owners of the property. The Department moved for summary judgment, asserting that it had a valid lien because Mrs. Gheen owned the properties at the time of her death and the quitclaim deeds were not valid. The district court granted summary judgment for the Department. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department’s Medicaid lien was valid as to the properties. View "Gheen v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Health" on Justia Law

Erin Clements was injured at work and received temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for twelve months. Clements subsequently obtained an extension of TTD benefits for the statutory maximum of twelve months. When Clements applied for additional TTD benefits, the Worker’s Safety and Compensation Division denied her claim because she had received all the TTD benefits to which she was entitled under Wyoming law and Division rules. Clements filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the Division exceeded its authority when it limited the extension of TTD benefits to twelve months. The district court granted declaratory relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Division exceeded its authority when it adopted a rule setting a maximum number of months TTD benefits are payable under any circumstances. View "State ex rel. Dep’t of Workforce Servs. v. Clements" on Justia Law

In 1994, Appellant suffered modest physical injuries while working as a psychiatric aide at the Wyoming State Hospital. Four years later, Appellant was denied permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. Appellant continued seeking medical treatment. Appellant reapplied for PTD benefits in 2009, but the Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division denied her claim. After a case hearing, a panel of the Medical Commission denied the subsequent application for PTD benefits, concluding that Appellant’s only disabling condition was psychological and not related to any compensable physical injury. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission reasonably concluded that Appellant did not establish entitlement to PTD benefits under the Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Act or the odd lot doctrine, and the Commission’s conclusions were in accordance with applicable law. View "In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Hathaway" on Justia Law

After the Department of Family Services (DFS) received reports regarding the care Children were receiving from Mother and Stepfather, the State filed a neglect petition. DFS’s efforts to reunify Children with Mother failed. The juvenile court subsequently ordered Children to remain in the custody of Father and that DFS move to terminate the parental rights of Mother to Children. DFS appealed, claiming it could not move to terminate Mother’s parental rights because it did not have custody of Children and therefore was not an “authorized agency” that may file a petition to terminate one’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DFS was an “authorized agency” under the relevant statute regardless of whether it had physical and/or legal custody of Children. View "In re LB" on Justia Law