Justia Wyoming Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of making a false written statement to obtain property and was sentenced to a two to five year period of incarceration. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Appellant later filed a motion entitled "Motion to Execute Sentence." The district court denied the motion. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court's sentence should be ordered to be executed to give effect to subsequent sentences in other jurisdictions and to avoid an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that the district court was without jurisdiction to consider Appellant's motion, as it was not a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and it was not a motion otherwise expressly provided for by rule or statute. Consequently, the Court was without jurisdiction to consider this appeal. View "Kurtenbach v. State" on Justia Law

Appellants both had their driver's licenses suspended, and both requested a contested case hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) to challenge the suspension. Appellants made several arguments regarding the validity of Laramie Enrolled Ordinance 1592, which makes it a misdemeanor to refuse to submit to a chemical test and enhances the penalties for driving under the influence if a chemical test reveals a certain elevated blood alcohol level. In each case, the OAH determined it did not have the authority to consider the validity of the ordinance and upheld the suspension of Appellants' driver's licenses. The district court upheld the OAH's decision and dismissed Appellants' request for a declaration that the ordinance was unenforceable and unconstitutional on the basis that Appellants failed to raise a justiciable controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the OAH appropriately found that the ordinance did not change the nature of the advisements law enforcement officers were required to provide an individual pursuant to the state's implied consent statutes; (2) the OAH also properly upheld Appellants' driver's license suspensions; and (3) the district court did not err when it dismissed Appellants' petition for declaratory relief. View "Sandoval v. State" on Justia Law

In 1982, Appellant pled guilty to aggravated robbery, among other crimes, in both Sweetwater and Uinta Counties. In subsequently federal court proceedings, the convictions in both counties were set aside. In the following state court proceedings, Appellant once again pled guilty to the charges. Upon resentencing in 1989, Appellant was sentenced to forty-five to fifty years for the Uinta County aggravated robbery charge. After serving thirty years in prison, Appellant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Appellant argued that the aggravated robbery statute, amended in 1983, applied retroactively, and thus, his forty-five to fifty year sentence was illegal because it exceeded the new statutory maximum. The district court granted the motion and reduced Appellant's sentence in the Uinta County aggravated robbery charge. On appeal, Appellant challenged various aspects of the district court's rulings on his motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) ruling that Appellant did not have the constitutional right to be present at the hearing in which the district court considered his motion and reduced his sentence; and (2) modifying Appellant's sentence without allowing him to withdraw the guilty plea. View "Osborn v. State" on Justia Law

The case involved two permitting actions for a wind energy project in the mountains of Converse County. Objectors included the Northern Laramie Range Alliance (NLRA) and Northern Laramie Range Foundation (NLRF). In the first case (Case 1), Objectors challenged the district court's affirmance of the County Board of County Commissioners (Board) decision to grant Wasatch Wind Intermountain, LLC's (Wasatch) application for a Wind Energy Conversion System Permit (WECS permit). They also challenged the court's rulings that NLRA and NLRF did not have standing to appeal the Board's decision. In the second case (Case 2), Objectors challenged the district court's affirmance of the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, Industrial Siting Council's (ISC) decision to grant a state industrial siting permit for construction of the project. In Case 1, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) NLRA had standing but NLRF did not; and (2) the Board properly granted Wasatch's application for a WECS permit. In Case 2, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ISC acted within its authority in granting the industrial siting permit, and there was sufficient evidence to justify its decision. View "N. Laramie Range Found. v. Converse County Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Mother and Father divorced. Mother was initially granted custody of their two children, but Father was later awarded sole custody of the children. Father subsequently relinquished physical custody of the younger child, AZS, to the children's maternal grandparents (Grandparents) after AZS was hospitalized for an appendectomy. The parties' older child, BJS, also moved to Wyoming to live with Grandparents. Thereafter, Mother petitioned for modification of custody, again seeking custody of the children. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, as Mother failed to satisfy her burden to provide a complete record for the Court's review, and Mother's brief failed to adhere to the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. View "Zeitner v. Shank" on Justia Law

While Mark and Elizabeth Dowell were still married, Mark created an irrevocable life insurance trust (ILIT) naming Elizabeth as is primary beneficiary and their two children as contingent beneficiaries. After the couple divorced, Mark filed a petition to modify the trust, contending that he did not need Elizabeth's consent to modify because she had relinquished her beneficial interest in the property settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mark. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the parties' divorce degree did not divest Elizabeth of her status as the primary beneficiary of the ILIT as a matter of law. Remanded with instructions to grant Elizabeth's motion for summary judgment. View "Dowell v. Dowell" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of one count of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree. Appellant appealed, contending (1) the victim was incompetent to testify, and (2) the district court improperly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was no evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had sexual contact with the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the victim satisfied the five-part test for witness competency, and the district court was not clearly erroneous in determining that she was competent to testify; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to show that Defendant engaged in sexual contract with the victim, and thus, the district court properly denied Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal. View "Hutchinson v. State" on Justia Law

Roundup Heights, a subdivision in Laramie County, was located within one mile of the City of Cheyenne. The owners of certain lots applied for County approval of a partial vacation of the subdivision plat. The County granted the partial vacation without City approval despite the City's contention that the partial vacation required joint approval by both the City and the County. The City filed suit, seeking declaratory judgment that joint City and County approval was required for partial vacation if the affected land was within one mile of the City. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the relevant statutes unambiguously do not require joint City and County approval of partial vacations if the affected property is wholly within the County. View "City of Cheyenne v. Laramie County Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to three counts of illegal drug possession, two counts being felonies, at arraignment. The district court found that a factual basis existed for all three counts but ordered a presentence investigation without accepting any of the pleas or adjudicating guilt. After the sentencing hearing, the district court deferred further proceedings without adjudicating guilt on both of the felonies pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 35-7-1037. The State filed a motion to reconsider. The district court then withdrew one of the deferrals, accepted Appellant's guilty plea on one count, and proceeded to sentencing. A judgment and sentence was subsequently filed, providing (1) section 35-7-1037 does not authorize a court to order deferral of multiple counts of an information or indictment, and (2) the court erred in deferring entry of conviction and sentence in both felony counts. Appellant challenged the order on the State's motion to reconsider. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State's motion to reconsider was filed and heard before judgment was entered and was not, therefore, a nullity; and (2) the motion to consider was not deemed denied under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 6(c)(2). View "McWilliams v. State" on Justia Law

Appellee left her car unattended with the motor running in her private driveway while she briefly returned to her home to retrieve her pocketbook. In the interim, Colbey Emms stole her vehicle. Emms later got into a high-speed chase, which ended when the car he was driving collided with a vehicle driven by Appellant, the mother of two children (collectively, Appellants). Appellant sued Appellee, alleging that Appellee breached a duty of due care to her and her children by leaving her car unattended with the keys in the ignition. The district court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment on the basis that no duty was owed to Appellants under either the common law or by statute, and that Appellee's leaving of her keys in her car with the motor running was not the proximate cause of the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellee's conduct was not proscribed by statute and therefore did not result in the violation of a statutory duty of care; and (2) Appellee did not owe Appellants a common law duty of care to protect them from the harm that occurred in this case. View "Lucero v. Holbrook" on Justia Law