Justia Wyoming Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case began in 2004 when Margo Belden and Fish Creek Designs, LLC filed suit against John Thorkildsen, claiming a breach of the LLC agreement and that Thorkildsen and his wife owned Fish Creek for payments it made on a loan. The case was appealed and remanded several times, largely in relation to Thorkildsen's motion for attorney fees and costs. In the fourth appeal of this matter, the Supreme Court took the unusual step of making a factual determination that the attorney fees Thorkildsen requested were reasonable and, in a specific remand, directed the district court to enter an order awarding Thorkildsen attorney fees in the amount of $77,475. In the fifth appeal of the matter, Thorkildsen challenged the district court's entry of the order the Court directed, claiming he was entitled to prejudgment interest on the fee award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the award of Thorkildsen's attorney fees was not a liquidated claim, and therefore, Thorkildsen was not entitled to prejudgment interest on the award. View "Thorkildsen v. Belden" on Justia Law

Appellant Timothy Shaeffer was convicted of aggravated assault and battery after he waved around a flare gun during an altercation at a bar. On appeal, Appellant claimed he was subject to numerous errors, which affected his right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to appoint Appellant new counsel on the second day of trial; (2) the trial court did not violate Appellant's right to self-representation, as Appellant never made an unequivocal request to represent himself; (3) the trial court did not require Appellant to wear excessive physical restraints, and the trial court's failure to not instruct the jury regarding the shackles did not constitute plain error; (4) after Appellant had been deemed competent to proceed, the circumstances at trial were not such that would have required an additional competency evaluation; (5) the trial court did not exhibit judicial bias against Appellant; and (6) the State did not provide the trial court with inappropriate or incorrect information at the sentencing hearing. View "Schaeffer v. State" on Justia Law

James Schlinger owned and operated Curtis Excavation and WW Construction. Schlinger, acting as president of WW Construction, entered into an oral agreement to lease his business and all associated equipment and land to Christopher McGhee and Jack Robinson. McGhee and Robinson formed Curtis-Westwood Construction as the entity to lease and operate the business. After eight months, Schlinger determined McGhee and Robinson were not properly managing the business and terminated the oral lease agreement. The parties disputed the financial implications of the termination. After a bench trial, the district court determined that Schlinger breached his oral agreement with Appellees, McGhee, Robinson, and Curtis-Westood Construction, and that Schlinger owed Plaintiffs $206,875. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's judgment on Appellees' breach of contract claim and rejected Appellants' argument that they should be awarded breach of contract damages, holding that the district court committed clear error in awarding damages as there was insufficient evidence in the record to justify an award of damages to either party; and (2) affirmed the district court's denial of Schlinger's claims for recovery under the theory of unjust enrichment, holding that Schlinger's claims were unsupported by the evidence. View "Schlinger v. McGhee" on Justia Law

In 2008-2009, Scott Davenport sought worker's compensation benefits for medical care and surgery to fuse vertebrae in his lumbar spine. The Workers' Safety and Compensation Division denied benefits on the basis that Davenport's 2008-2009 back problems were not caused by work related injuries Davenport suffered in 1984 and 1985. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the Division's denial of benefits, ruling that the procedure was necessitated by a preexisting congenital defect in Davenport's lumbar spine and not his prior work related injuries. The district court affirmed the OAH decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the OAH decision was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and was, therefore, supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Davenport v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div." on Justia Law

In 2008, the Teton County Commission approved a parcel boundary adjustment application regarding certain real property located in Teton County. Appellees, several individuals, sought judicial review of the Commission's decision. In 2008 and 2009, respectively, Appellants, Mark Menolascino and William Hirshberg, purchased the property. Neither sought to intervene in the judicial review proceedings. In 2011, the reviewing district court reversed the Commission's decision. The parties to the original administrative proceedings declined to appeal the ruling. Appellants, however, filed a notice of appeal. They contemporaneously filed a motion to intervene in the district court proceedings for the sole purpose of pursuing the appeal therefrom. The district court denied their motion to intervene, a decision which Appellants also appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and (1) affirmed the district court's denial of Appellants' request to interview in the judicial review proceedings; and (2) dismissed Appellants' appeal of the final order of the district court for lack of standing because of Appellants' status as nonparties. View "Hirshberg v. Coon" on Justia Law

Steven Kruger pled guilty to felony child abuse. At the scheduled sentencing Kruger sought to withdraw the guilty plea. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Kruger's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding (1) considering the totality of the circumstances, Kruger's plea was knowing and voluntary; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Kruger did not present any "fair and just reason" to withdraw his guilty plea; and (3) Kruger's plea was not in the nature of an Alvord plea because Kruger never professed his innocence and did not meet his burden of proving that the victims recanted. View "Kruger v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to one count of interference with a police officer. The district court sentenced Appellant to three to six years incarceration. The prison sentence was suspended pursuant to the split sentencing provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 7-13-107, and Appellant was ordered to serve 180 days in jail, to be followed by four years of supervised probation. Later, Appellant admitted to violating his probation, after which the district court reimposed the original sentence, giving credit for time served. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in reimposing sentence after Appellant's probation was revoked. View "Castillo v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant David Walker was convicted of felony stalking as a result of an encounter with his ex-wife in violation of a permanent order of protection. A conviction for stalking required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that plain error resulted when the trial court instructed the jury that evidence of acts comprising a course of conduct of harassment admitted as Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b) uncharged misconduct need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence where a course of conduct of harassment is an element of the charged offense. View "Walker v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Enroe Jealous was convicted of aggravated assault and battery and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three to eight years. Jealous appealed, contending that the district court committed reversible error when it failed to properly instruct the jury on the elements of the crime. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury was not misled or confused as to the elements of the crime; (2) the district court did not plainly err by failing to define the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," and "recklessly"; and (3) it was not plain error for he district court to instruct the jury that it could base its verdict on any and all proven theories of guilt. View "Jealous v. State" on Justia Law

A jury found Gloria Landeroz (1) guilty of aggravated assault and battery and (2) not guilty of attempted first degree murder and the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter. The State subsequently moved for dismissal of the attempted first degree murder charge without prejudice. The district court granted the motion. Landeroz appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the district court erred in dismissing the charge because in doing so it exposed her to double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the jury verdict but remanded for an entry of an order clarifying that the dismissal of the attempted first degree murder charge was "with prejudice" as to that offense, but "without prejudice" as to the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter, holding (1) to the extent the dismissal without prejudice suggested Landeroz could be re-prosecuted for attempted first or second degree murder, the order violated the double jeopardy clause; and (2) Landeroz did not meet her burden of providing a Brady violation occurred, depriving her of due process. View "Landeroz v. State" on Justia Law