Justia Wyoming Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In consolidated appeals, plaintiff challenged the district court's conclusions that its property was properly included in the South of Laramie Water and Sewer District ("district") and that the district lawfully issued certain general obligation bonds. Plaintiff also challenged the refusal of the Board of County Commissioners of Albany County ("board") to exclude plaintiff's property from the district. The court affirmed Docket No. S-10-0199 and held that plaintiff was barred from challenging the inclusion of its property in the district and found that the district's proposed general obligation bond issue was not unlawful. In Docket No. S-10-0238, the court answered certified questions related to the Wyoming board of county commissioners' power to remove real property from a water and sewer district and the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Claim I under section 12(b)(6) where a motion to dismiss under section 12(b)(6) was an appropriate vehicle in which to raise the issue of the passage of a period of limitations; where Wyo. State. Ann 41-10-107(g) unambiguously forbade any "petition in error [or] other appeal" from a board's resolution establishing a water district, and unambiguously stated that the "organization of the district shall not be directly or collaterally questioned in any suit, action or proceeding" except "an action in the nature of a writ of quo warranto, commenced by the attorney general within thirty (30) days after the resolution..."; and where there was no inherent right to appeal from administrative action.

Appellant, owner of sixty-seven shares of corporate stock of Burnett Livestock Company, appealed the district court's summary judgment that imposed a constructive trust upon those sixty-seven shares for the benefit of several of her relatives including appellees, her aunt and uncle, in accordance with the provisions of a document entitled Agreement for Disposition of Rental and/or Royalty Income, signed on February 20, 1989 by appellant's mother and appellant's grandmother. At issue was whether the evidence submitted supported the parties' respective motions for summary judgment. The court reversed the order granting summary judgment in favor of appellees and remanded for further proceedings holding that there was insufficient evidence on the record to prove the elements of a constructive trust.

Plaintiffs, Eva D. and Lee J. Kelly, appealed the district court's finding that they exercised undue influence over Robert Lee McNeel and invalidated the trust and will in which Mr. McNeel had named Ms. Kelly as one of two beneficiaries in place of his son. Plaintiffs also appealed the district court's grant, in a separate proceeding, to remove Ms. Kelly as Mr. McNeel's guardian and conservator and appointment of the son to replace her. At issue was whether the district court's finding of undue influence and removal of plaintiff as guardian and conservator of Mr. McNeel's trust was clearly erroneous. The court held that, in light of the circumstances, the district court did not err in its order invalidating the 2005 trust amendment and will and that the district court had the authority to remove plaintiff as guardian conservator upon determining that she was not acting in the best interest of Mr. McNeel.

The biological mother of the child at issue appealed from the order allowing the father and stepmother's petition to adopt the minor child to proceed without the mother's consent because she did not pay child support for a year before the petition was filed. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by allowing the petition for adoption to proceed without the consent of the mother and whether evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the mother had willfully failed to pay child support. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that the mother willfully failed to support her child where she failed to take the necessary steps to become employed and support her child and that she failed to demonstrate that, through whatever means were available to her, she had not forgotten her legal obligation to support her child. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's findings.

Appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, as well as a denial of his new trial motion, after he was found guilty of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault and battery, felony possession of a controlled substance, and interference with an emergency call. Appellant raised five issues of error on appeal. The court held that the district court did not err when it denied appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal where he waived his right to challenge the district court's ruling in his appeal and that the district court did not abuse its discretion and properly admitted the statements at issue as excited utterances under W.R.E. 803(2). The court also held that there was no plain error when the district court referred to the complaining witness as "the victim" where evidence of appellant's guilt was substantial and where there was no reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict would have been more favorable to appellant in the absence of that isolated statement. The court further held that appellant was not denied his constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury where the district court concluded that he did not satisfy the first part of the McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood test. The court finally held that appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel where appellant failed to establish that counsel's performance was legally deficient in any of the identified areas and where appellant made no showing of actual prejudice. Accordingly, the court found no reversible error and affirmed the district court's denial of a new trial and affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence.

Maverick Motorsports Group, LLC ("Maverick") challenged a decision of the State Board of Equalization ("SBOE") that certain sales by Maverick were subject to Wyoming sales tax. At issue was whether sales of recreational vehicles were taxable in Wyoming because possession was transferred in Wyoming. Also at issue was whether enforcement and collection of Wyoming sales taxes violated the Commerce Clause. The court affirmed the actions of the SBOE and held that the purchase of the various recreational vehicles at issue constituted a taxable event where buyers took possession of the vehicles in Wyoming and that collection of sales taxes on these vehicles met constitutional requirements and did not violate the Commerce Clause.

Defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress after he was charged with two counts of sexual exploitation of children. At issue was whether the misstatement of fact in the affidavit for a search warrant be stricken as knowingly and intentionally made or in reckless disregard for the truth. Also at issue was whether defendant's right to confrontation and due process was violated based on a failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and, if stricken, whether probable cause for the search of the computer IP address or residence existed within the four corners of the affidavit. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress and held that defendant did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the deputy's misstatements were deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for the truth and that the affidavits, even without the proper date and time, provided probable cause to issue the search warrants. Furthermore, because defendant's conditional plea did not preserve any Brady v. Maryland issue, the court declined to consider the issue on appeal.

Joe's Concrete and Lumber, Inc. ("Joe's Concrete") sought attorneys fees from Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. ("CWC") after CWC breached its contract with Joe's concrete. At issue was whether the district court properly denied attorneys fees. The court held that Joe's Concrete was entitled to recover its attorneys fees where the attorneys fees were not an element of damages to be proved at trial but were collateral to the merits of the case.

Appellant appealed his sentence contending that it was "illegal" when he was convicted of aggravated assault and battery where the sentence was conditionally stayed pending his admission to an alcohol treatment center ("WYSTAR"). At issue was whether appellant's sentence was illegal merely because the district court stayed its issuance of the mittimus, in order to conditionally release him for alcohol abuse treatment, and later issued the mittimus without a further hearing. The court held that the sentence imposed by the district court was unusual, and perhaps ill-advised. However, the court also held that it did not find in the record on appeal circumstances that rendered it an "illegal" sentence. Accordingly, the order of the district court denying appellant's motion was remanded for the purpose of amending the disputed sentence so as to credit him for all time served in connection with his detention at WYSTAR.

Appellant Leroy Harris challenged that portion of the district courtâs sentence which required him to pay, as a portion of the costs of prosecution, the fees paid by the State to some of the witnesses who testified against him. Appellant was charged with aggravated assault and battery, but acquitted by the jury on that count. Appellant also faced a misdemeanor charge to which he was convicted and required to pay a portion of the costs of prosecution. Appellant contended that he should not have had to pay witness fees for witnesses whose testimony was primarily related to the felony count for which he was acquitted. Appellant argued that the State failed to present any evidence to support its claim for the witness fees. The Supreme Court reviewed the lower court and agreed that the State did not present evidence sufficient to support its claim for costs. The Court affirmed the judgment, but reversed and remanded the sentence to remove the provision that Appellant pay the challenged witness fees.